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1. Introduction
　Why does Japanese company have adopted “pure-holding company”? In Japan, there are 
several changing trends of business structures from 1₉₅₀’s to ₂₀₀₀’s. First trend of Japanese 
business organization was to adopt functional organization in order to recover from the defeat 
in second world wars. After the 1₉₆₀’s, the level of GNP (Gross National Products) was over the 
peak level of the GNP before that war, and most of large industrial business groups was to 
adopt multi-divisional organizations. Especially, home or Industrial Electronic products 
makers had produced and exported television, radio, home appliances and various parts for 
making such products from Japan to USA or Europe. After 1₉₇₀’s, Japanese large electronics 
industrial companies, SONY, Matsushita, Toshiba, Hitachi and, Mitsubishi Electrics, had 
adopted Japanese unique semi-independent divisional structure with using intra-company’s 
capital systems which were equal to internal capital measurement system on each division-
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2basis.  Firstly, Matsushita Electronics (the company’s name was changed into “Panasonics Co. 
Ltd.” in around ₂₀₀₄s) had adopted such system around 1₉₆₀’s. At that time, the main 
objectives to use intra capital allocation into each division for management control were to 
check and evaluate many divisions’ performance as profit centers. However, after 1₉₉₀’s 
Japanese large multi-divisional companies had changed their business structure and 
management control systems into “intra-investment centers”. Especially, SONY had firstly 
adopted “investment center as business responsibility concepts” to implement management 
control for each of multi-divisions. We thought these kinds of changes about management 
control methods from functional’ cost centers, profit centers and to investment centers were 
that top management realized the methodology for controlling business units with being scale-
up and business manager’s performance evaluation.  
　We think those kinds of organizational design’s change or evolution were very important as 
we, business scholars, tried to understand Japanese management control models. Especially 
these changing trends of organizational design were repeatedly studied by our Japanese 
management scholars as “Japanese Decentralization problems” about that business 
bankruptcy of several large-scale financial companies had occurred, for examples, the defaults 
of “Daiwa Bank, Long term Credit Bank of Japan and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank”. That is” 
Gosou-Sendan-Housiki” which means that industrial group management with a large bank as 
a center had broken. Also, there was also “big-bang” of world financial system, and Japanese 
industrial law for anti-trust was abolished and Japanese government had authorized new anti-
trust law and recognized pure-holding companies’ system in 1₉₉₇.  
　We thought there were two main dominant cases for setting up pure holding companies in 
Japan after such big change of business group management. The first is that Japanese 
companies can try to set up pure holding company systems only to control subsidiaries as like 
equities holder who could delegate more responsibility into division’s manager who can do good 
profit management. The second is to set up more number of subsidiaries after merger or 
acquisition (M&A) for making synergy or getting larger scale in some business domains. Also, 
the one of main objectives to set up pure holding company is to promote decentralizations with 
more autonomous business units. After ₂₀₀₀th Top management of large-scale industrial firms 
would also consider this type of organizational re-structure to be very effective for dynamic 
business rearrangement (Shimotani (₂₀₀₉), p. ₂1). Thus, we are concerned with how such pure 
holding company have tried to do corporate governance under “pure-holding structure”. 
Especially our main concerns are related to how management control system is designed under 
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such pure holding company.
₂. Old but New problems: Sub optimization problems
　Originally, according to traditional responsibility accounting, top management only accept 
profit responsibility under functional organization, thus, there are often sub-optimization 
problems under such organization structure because head-quarter or top management can only 
manage goal conflicts between sales and productions department. On the other hand, under 
multi-divisional or subsidiaries group system each division has independent authority against 
another division or head-quarter. It is easy for head-quarter to measure each division’s 
performance based on profit or divisional ROI. However, there might be some wall between 
each division or subsidiary and head-quarter, because top management of head-quarter could 
not see the activities or decisions making to be relevant under each division. Especially as each 
division manager seeks to optimize short-term profit maximizations, head-quarter could not 
make strength corporate governance or centripetal force, and new type of sub-optimization 
might have been occurred between some divisions. Thus, there are two types of policy or 
methods for top management to adopt against such sub-optimization. One is to execute 
corporate or group strategy for top executives in holdings with using middle range profit plans 
and budget or doing financial management as top-down-like with the support of divisional 
controller. Other way is to make some windows between some kind of wall in each division 
with using some information from management control systems and with making interaction 
between divisions or division and head-quarter. The former is concerned with management 
control system under traditional centralized decision making. According to latest research, the 
latter is concerned with intra-incubation activities or making new market development with 
the interaction between head-quarter and divisions. However, we though most of cases 
indicated the main functions of management control systems is to disjoint corporate strategy 
into detail objectives and financial plans or performance evaluation measures. Such measures 
are expected to promote goal congruent behavior in division’s manager or business managers if 
they accept their own formal performance measures as their own goals. However, under 
information un-symmetry about environmental factors between divisions and head-quarter, 
there are possible for sub-optimum results to occur between total company’s goal achievement 
and sum of each division’s achievement. For example, if some business units would be getting 
be matured, the manager of such units usually try to start new product development with not 
4ending such matured business or with continuing such matured one. As the different case, if 
one old business unit try to set up new business with reporting the mixing old and new 
business unit’s performance into total results, head-quarter could not divide new business into 
independent one as division manager deliberately try not to disclose new business 
performance. For example, “ ₃ M ” company try to use a skunk work as one method of setting 
up new business action, but it is often said that such action could not be successful or is 
absorbed by old one. Business-subsidiary or department try to grow main business or to deploy 
new business with the development in head-quarter as a new seed or with M&A of new 
business from out-side market. 
₃. The balance between centrifugal force and centripetal force
　To solve the sub-optimization problem as whole of company, we think to keep the balance 
between head-quarter’s centrifugal force and subsidiary’s centripetal force. We could find an 
example which indicates a company abolishing pure-holding company systems and moves into 
“intra-divisional company systems”. According with our interviews about the reason of 
returning into intra-divisional systems from pure holding company systems, there is too weak 
centrifugal force in head-quarter and some kinds of independent firm’s behavior or decision 
making could be found in such a subsidiary. In such a case, the subsidiary independently 
manages his resource and could collect some funds from bank with his own name. This kind of 
examples are often found in Japanese oversea subsidiaries. Also, if, head-quarter of pure 
holding companies would like to control independent-like behavior of subsidiary, there would 
be frequent interferences about daily business, or frequent demands for reports into over-sea 
subsidiaries by head-quarter in Japan. In the case of Japanese enterprises to be enlarged 
during short period by means of buying over-sea subsidiaries as M&A, although these 
enterprises are under high level of decentralization, there are possible for head-quarter not to 
have enough management control systems to induce subsidiaries to do new strategic 
development for adopting new environment. 
　In the opposite sense, we can hypothetically think that successful head-quarter might have 
strong centripetal force against subsidiaries’ strong centrifugal force of them.
　Thus, we think how to build management control systems under holding systems is one of 
our research theme in this study. Also, we need to consider the combinations of various 
subsystem of management control systems as well as responsibility accounting systems. 
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However, as the first approach to understand management control systems of pure holding 
company, we try to consider the elements of both centripetal force and centrifugal force.
₄. Centrifugal force and Centripetal force
4.1　The reason of holding company’s system not to be functional
　There are several reasons of holding companies not to achieve good performance in Japan. 
Here we try to pay attention into the followings.
　Firstly, the problem is that the head-quarter of pure holding companies does not make full 
function of his own role. Secondly, such subsidiaries do not see the whole business structure 
because there is high wall between each of subsidiaries than the wall between intra-companies. 
Thirdly, there are some lack of performance evaluation systems, and subsidiary’s executives 
tend to put high priority on his own company’s performance rather than whole group 
performances. In this paper, we try to pay attention into the first issue.
4.2　The balance between Centrifugal force and Centripetal force
　We think that one of reason why Pure Holding Systems has not done good performance in 
Japan owes to the unbalance between centripetal force of Head-quarter and centrifugal force of 
business subsidiaries. We often find such a case of that generally centripetal force of head-
quarter is weaker than subsidiaries’ centrifugal force. When each subsidiary achieves his own 
goals or targets, head-quarter (means pure holding company) does not exercise his own power 
on subsidiary’s operational work. Rather, he timely accepts the performance report from 
subsidiaries and if he finds some problems or questions about subsidiary’s results, he asks for 
additional reports from local financial or accounting staffs. There is very rare case for head-
quarter to intervene into a problem about business problems or supply chain problems. Thus, 
autonomous daily business decisions are done in each business unit (=subsidiaries) semi-
independently, the business unit’s manager considers head-quarter as looking like as if it were 
overhead departments or stockholders because he supplies services for each business unit or 
demands his dividends. Thus, how much of the degree about the power balance between 
centrifugal and centripetal will be decided by the extent of keeping, using and the influences 
on such resources between business units and head-quarter. We indicate the kinds of such 
powers under Table 1.
　As we show the contents of centrifugal and centripetal power, the centripetal power of 
6Table 1　The concrete example for getting centripetal force and centrifugal force
Holdings’ centripetal force Function of each force Subsidiary’s centrifugal force
Holdings to have the right of 
BU’s president
Human resource affairs BU to have the right of human 
resources 
The right to raise funds or 
allocate them
Funds raising The degree of BU to be able to 
raise funds from market by 
himself
Dividends from business units, 
and the payments from BU for 
services received from holdings
Revenue of holdings The pricing or the amounts to 
b e  g i v e n  i n t o  B U  t o  d o 
dividends or payments for the 
received services  and the 
allowance of retained profits to 
be recognized in BU
An authority of investment 
decisions
T h e  a m o u n t s  o f  c a p i t a l 
investments
The degree of BU’s manager to 
do  capi ta l  investment  by 
himself (maximum amounts of 
cash to do investments)
Corporate strategy planning 
and the intervention into each 
business unit strategy planning 
and implementation
S t r a t e g i c  p l a n n i n g  a n d 
implementation
B u s i n e s s  u n i t s ’  s t r a t e g y 
planning and implementation
The  ex tent  o f  func t i ona l 
intervention for auditing into 
business units
Auditing The degree of participation 
f r o m  B u s  i n t o  h o l d i n g s ’ 
auditing into them
The ratio of holdings ’ total 
staffs to temporary transfer 
into business units
Officer’s positions concurrently 
and sharing information
Whether BU’s president can 
have a position in holdings 
directors’ board or not.
The number of holdings staffs, 
and the number of functional 
roles of HD, the value ratios of 
t o t a l  r e a l  e s t a t e s  t o  b e 
registered in the name of 
holdings
The relative scale between 
Holdings and Subsidiary
BU’s sales or assets’ volume 
and the extent of BU to hold 
real estate or intangibles
T h e  d e g r e e  o f  c o r p o r a t e 
philosophies to be spread into 
all of staffs, or the existence of 
charismatic leader
Management doctrine and 
executives
W h e t h e r  B U s  h a v e  o w n 
m a n a g e m e n t  c l i m a t e s  o r 
unique president
Note : See the source at the summary in “Asada et al. (₂₀₀₈), (₂₀₀₉)”.
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headquarter and the centrifugal power of business units mean the relative one or the degree of 
influences on some resources. According to these arguments, the relationship between head-
quarter and each subsidiary is decided by the following factors; (1) the beginning relation on 
the holdings system to be born. (₂) the top-management policy, (₃) the extent of demands or 
pressure on subsidiaries by the strategies of top management, and stakeholders’ pressure 
(including main debts holders, equity holders, and employees).  
　However, if we pay attention into the degree of balance between centrifugal and centripetal 
powers, there are four factors to be very important for us to know holding management to be 
functional. The first is the power of head-quarter to be access into investment funds, the 
second is the policy for executives’ employments and assignments, and the third is the relative 
scale of each subsidiary or the distribution of them against head-quarter (which means there 
are no dominant player in each subsidiary), and the forth is the designing power or strategic 
intents of head-quarter.
4.3　The need of centripetal force to be made strength in holding company
　Where is the reason as the centripetal force to be weak? We try to check the reason of that 
some pure-holding companies have weak centripetal forces. According to our surveys into 
manufacturing companies in Japan around ₂₀₀₆-₂₀₀₇th, as well as some other research’s 
projects’ results. 
　The first is strategic organizational design’s problem; One company has no clear policy for 
classifying corporate center’s function and service center’s function and one of the former 
functions is separated from head-quarter (Yamada, ₂₀1₀). This indicates that a head-quarter 
which have weak centripetal force could not have clear policy discerning strategic functions 
and common operational functions. As the results, such company which has no clear policy 
about such forces to be discriminated made unnecessary business units which mean there are 
too much number of subsidiaries. For example, Hitachi Co. Ltd., Fuji Electric Holdings Co. 
Ltd. And Japanese general trading companies in 1₉₉₀th had done such policy. 
　Second is that top management of pure holdings tried to make scale-down of head-quarter, 
and head-quarter could not do the role as basic strategic center. This case was found from New 
Life Group which was changed into the name of LIXIL Co. Ltd in July ₂nd, ₂₀1₂ and also JX 
group.1）
1 ）　Financial details of each segments from Consolidated balance sheets is checked by corporate. 
8　Also, it is better that some functions of business subsidiaries should be centralized into 
head-quarter of pure holdings. As some examples, we could indicate that research and 
development functions should be centralized and they could develop several kinds of new 
business. Business units or subsidiaries could develop new products with using such seeds or 
new technologies and also if head-quarter of pure-holdings could obtain new intangibles from 
such idea development, it could gain more strategic power. Also, there are synergy effects or 
economy of scope with saving costs of R&D activities not to be done under multiple business 
unit sites. Of course, according with the business paper or president message of holdings 
company a number of pure holdings company often say this cost saving effects under central 
R&D of holdings, but looking at Konica-Minoruta holdings case, there were the diversity of 
development activities under R&D subsidiaries before two companies to be consolidated, and 
we knew there were insufficient rearrangement of such R&D activities after the consolidation. 
We also think that the redeployment of personnel beyond each subsidiary is impossible 
without the right of personnel management under head-quarter of pure-holdings. Because 
manager don’t like to accept transferring good human resources into another subsidiary. To do 
such inter-division’s allocation of human resources, head-quarter must have corporate data-
base for human resources including personnel information and each personal carrier plan. 
Thus, to do strategic human resource management, head-quarter must have centralized 
authority for redeployment of managers. Finally, if head-quarter could not smoothly allocate 
financial resources and core-human resources, the sub-optimization of such resources 
allocations will be occurred. According to our surveys, Dowa holdings group takes full efforts to 
solve communications’ gap problem and to do the full agreement of strategic decision makings 
among managers.
4.4　 The methods for centripetal force of head-quarter to be reinforced and the 
abolish of pure holdings system
　I understand the transfer from pure holding company to business holding company that is 
thought to be not the abolishment of main head-quarter’s functions but to be intensified in a 
controller and top executives and their work to check the details of business units ’ 
performances as first steps of controlling should be done by them and these feedback is 
returned into the details of local management and local controller. However, Lixcil and New-
life group are said to be very weak for such central-management. 
　We try to explain the reason with a case: of that Fuji Heavy Electric Co. Ltd. made business 
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holding company in ₂₀₀₃ from pure holdings company. According with this case, Because of no 
advancement of business cooperation or of human resource exchanges between subsidiaries 
and as a result, there are business efficiency to be worse. Top management of pure holdings 
company need to strengthen centripetal force as a group and the head-quarter of holdings 
absorbed Fuji Electric Systems Co. as an intra-division and pure holdings company changed 
into business holdings company with core business of “energy and environmental businesses” 
in April, ₂₀11.
　Of course, we look at the cases with the abolishment of pure-holdings Company, there are 
several different reasons about such changes. We think there is one of such change not to be 
the failure of pure holdings company system. One company try to make diversification and top 
management had changed from such strategy and had adopted focusing strategy and there 
was no significance of “pure-holding company system”. This case indicates the proposition of 
“organization follows strategy”.
　For example, Okuma Holdings Co. Ltd、consolidated into one company from three 
subsidiaries which were named as Okuma Houwa Machining Co. Ltd, Okuma Engineering 
and Okuma subsidiary. This case can be interpreted as temporal integration for group 
restructuring into the final organization. Also, we could see the same case in Maekawa 
Manufacturing Company for adopting into new environmental condition which means the 
reorganization from decentralization structure into one functional structure. Also, if we look at 
the case of Sojitsu Corporation which was realized from the integration from Nisho Iwai 
Trading corporation and Nichimen Trading corporation, there are possibility of holding 
company as temporal tool during solving some conflicts between such two companies and 
finally Sojitsu become into intra-divisions’ business units. 
　On the other hand, it would be problem how such company could continue holding systems 
which had adopted such company system and repeatedly made such organizational 
rearrangement. Thus, whether they could keep holding systems depend on the strength of 
head-quarter of holdings.
　Thus, we try to study how a large-scale company could make strength of head quarter by the 
two cases of “AEON Holdings” and “Seven and i Holdings”. These two companies need holdings 
company system because of making and growing the large-scale merchandising by means of 
business re-constructing. In other words, they need and put management resources on head 
quarter of holdings company and try to produce synergy effects from such resources or value 
creation by means of maneuverability. We try to explain such case in the next section.
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₅. A discussion of Holding Company Systems from the case of “AEON ” 
and “Seven and i Holdings” 
　Why two companies had adopted pure holdings system? We try to explain two companies’ 
strategy and business model. Also, we want to explain the characteristics of holdings system 
and how to make the enhancement of centripetal force.” AEON Holdings” and “SEVEN and i 
Holdings” companies belong to retailing business segments with various goods shops. AEON is 
No.1 Company and Seven and i is No.₂ company of retailing business about the sales volume 
in Japan. Two companies do decentralize their business operation decisions into each business 
segments which mean virtual business group to be divided by three or four business segments; 
retail moll business, food shopping retail business, general shopping store business and 
Financial service business (bank). As we said each business segment have divided into 
subsidiaries which are managed by management of regional or national legal entity. So, we 
think that the autonomy of each subsidiaries is relatively high if you would compare retail 
business with manufacturing business in Japan. The holdings of such group must have exact 
and speedy monitoring system to check the performances and to order managers of each 
segment and each subsidiary. The head-quarter of holdings often demands financial results of 
each subsidiaries.
5.1　 The effect of “holdings system” is doubt for effective management of large 
group companies
　Both, “AEON and Seven and i” have high possibility of doing direct investment into over-sea 
markets because there is mature state of domestic consumer markets in these days. If I had to 
compare the two groups, I would say AEON holdings are said to be growth orientation and 
Seven and i holdings are to be profit conscious. The former is to make active M&A and to make 
various kinds of shops owing to the characteristics of marketing area in over sea market, 
especially China and ASEAN countries. Their main business for retail marketing is developed 
into specialty store, super markets, convenience store and department stores. They try to 
make more synergy with the additions of consumer financial services, moll developer and 
information technology services which are directly controlled under holdings as subsidiaries. 
Thus, we think holdings system is effective and important character to do business portfolio 
management. Also, the latter of two companies also has general store subsidiary, department 
store business and convenience store business group. Especially Seven and i holdings has very 
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strong business segments, that is, convenience stores business. 
　We think that the goal of setting up pure holdings company in Japan is to make the 
centripetal forces strong with keeping some resources centrally; human affairs, financial 
resources and data or information’s resources (The Nikkei Veritas, ₂₀1₀, p.1₄). However, 
looking at the financial data of AEON Holdings, I do not see the financial performance of 
AEON Holdings which was reflected from such centripetal effects in February ₂₀1₀. On the 
other hand, looking at the financial performance of Seven and i Holdings, this company 
performance is better than the results of AEON holdings. We think that the main reason of 
such differences about financial performances depend on the superior or strong convenience 
store business units in Seven and i holdings. However, roughly speaking about such differences 
of two groups performance, we could put the two companies in the similar position about 
financial results and also global investments into oversea business is not enough for these two 
companies.
　Thus, we try to discuss the reasons why these two companies did not have realized the 
intention to adopt pure holdings company system. Originally, in February ₂₀₀₆ Seven and i 
groups had transferred into pure holdings company from industrial company with having some 
subsidiaries and in June ₂₀₀₈ Aeon pure holdings was to start from industrial company with 
subsidiaries to pure holdings. However, looking at the sales volume of two companies, Seven 
and i holdings had increased sales volume from ₂₀₀₇ to ₂₀₀₈, but after such period their sales 
volume had decreased. Also, Aeon holdings also had increased sales volume from ₂₀₀₆ to ₂₀₀₈, 
but in ₂₀1₀ their sales volume became decreased a little. Looking at Operating profit of two 
companies, Seven and i holdings had decreased and leveled. Also, Aeon holdings had shown 
the similar situation. 
　Judging from the reasons; we think that the substantial rise of raw materials price and 
commodity prices increasing from January ₂₀₀₈ to February ₂₀₀₉ and the disorder of financial 
crisis in USA and the influence of such disorder into European and Asian Economy had 
reflected into two companies’ economic performance.
　Also, looking into the rate of gross capital return, we think the transformation from business 
holdings groups into pure holdings group in seven and i group as well as Aeon group had no 
clear positive impact into such figures of two groups. Looking more detail figures of financial 
performance indicators of EV/EBITDA of Seven and i Holdings, the result is lower than the 
average figure of it. Thus, our tentative conclusion of financial performance of this group is 
that the scale merit through business diversifications could not increase corporate value and 
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introduce conglomerate discounts. 
　The ROEs of Seven and i Holdings as well as of AEON is less than 1₀ percent’s, if we 
compare two companies with European and American big retailers, Costco or Tesco, we can 
say two companies’ ROEs are said to be too match low. (Nikkei Business ₂₀₀₈, ₂, 1₈. p.1₈)
5.2　 The course from Business holdings to Pure holdings and Organizational 
rearrangement
　₅.₂.1　The details of Aeon group from business holdings to pure holdings
　We think the business model of Aeon group is to make progress of scale volume under 
increasing the number of domestic retail shops, and also is to get complimentary effect based 
on real estate development which means shopping mall development and retail financial 
services (see Table ₂). Thus, they recognized their retail sales profitability is to be low, but try 
Table 2　The Financial Summary of Aeon Holdings and Seven and i Holdings
　　　　　　　　　　(From ₂₀₀₇ through ₂₀11)
Aeon’s financial summary (units: Million Yen)
Feb.₂₀₀₇ Feb.₂₀₀₈ Feb.₂₀₀₉ Feb.₂₀1₀ Feb.₂₀11
Sales Volume (million Yen) ₄,₃₄₅,₃₀₈ ₄,₆₅₀,₀₈₈ ₄,₇₀₆,₀₆₉ ₄,₅₄₂,₅₉₉ ₄,₅₆1,₇₄₈
Current Profit 1₈₈,₃₀₃ 1₆₆,₃₂₆ 1₂₆,₀₃₀ 1₃₀,1₉₈ 1₈₂,₀₈₀
Net Profit After Tax ₅₇,₆₅₆ ₄₃,₉₃₂ -₂,₇₆₀ ₃1,1₂₃ ₅₉,₆₈₈
Net Assets volume 1,₂₀₀,₇₈₃ 1,1₆₇,₄₇₇ 1,1₀₅,₇1₂ 1,1₄₄,₄₃₄ 1,₂1₉,₂₃₆
Total Assets Volume ₃,₅₃₄,₃₄₆ ₃,₅₉1,₄₀₆ ₃,₇₄1,₄₄₇ ₃,₇₈₅,₂₈₈ ₃,₇₇₄,₆₂₈
Net Profits per stocks ₇₇.₃1 ₅₅.₇₅ -₃.₆1 ₄₀.₆₈ ₇₈.₆1
Return of Equity(ROE) ₇.₃ ₄.₉ -₀.₃　 ₃.₇ ₆.₉
Seven and i Holdings Summary (units: Million Yen)
Feb.₂₀₀₇ Feb.₂₀₀₈ Feb.₂₀₀₉ Feb.₂₀1₀ Feb.₂₀11
Sales Volume (million Yen) ₅,₃₃₇,₈₀₆ ₅,₇₅₂,₃₉₂ ₅,₆₄₉,₉₄₈ ₅,111,₂₉₇ ₅,11₉,₇₃₉
Current Profit ₂₈₂,₀1₆ ₂₇₈,₂₆₂ ₂₇₉,₃₀₆ ₂₂₆,₉₅₀ ₂₄₂,₉₀₇
Net Profit After Tax 1₃₃,₄1₉ 1₃₀,₆₅₇ ₉₂,₂₃₆ ₄₄,₈₇₅ 111,₉₆1
Net Asset Volume 1,₉₆₉,1₄₉ ₂,₀₅₈,₀₃₈ 1,₈₆₀,₆₇₂ 1,₇₉₃,₉₄₀ 1,₇₇₆,₅1₂
Total Assets Volume ₃,₈₀₉,1₉₂ ₃,₈₈₆,₆₈₀ ₃,₇₂₇,₀₆₀ ₃,₆₇₃,₆₀₅ ₃,₇₃₂,111
Net Profits per stocks 1₄₂.₉₀ 1₃₇.₀₃ 1₀₀.₅₄ ₄₉.₆₇ 1₂₆.₂1
Return of Equity(ROE) 　₇.₆ 　₆.₇ 　₄.₉ ₂.₆ 　₆.₅
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to invite high profitability professional shops into his moll and intend to get rents from them. 
The main shop of Aeon group is “super market” to sell foods and grocery and most of tenants in 
his shopping center is to sell value-added goods than the grocery shops and the customer are 
used to buy such goods by means of credit sales. So, Aeon had supported credit or financial 
service business. However, looking at the financial reports of Aeon holdings in ₂₀1₀, the 
segment of professional shopping service shows the operating net loss. 
　As the enlargement of sales areas by Aeon group make the expansion of his own assets and 
liability, but owing to the domestic economic worse, there was no expansion of sales volume. 
Also, in ₂₀₀₆ the government legislated new regulation over the shop with more than 1₀,₀₀₀ 
square meters, the number of opening new shops in the moll located at a suburb had been 
decreased. Also, the average loan rate was down into 1₈ percent by the revisions of loan 
business rate. The results of such regulation revision made negative impact on the financial 
performance. Aeon as well as Seven and Ai holdings had changed his policy from enlargement 
of shopping centers to restraining the speed of opening new shopping center or closing some 
shopping moll to show the loss in ₂₀₀₇. According to the business journal in ₂₀₀₈, Aeon had to 
face direct financing business to be difficult (Nikkei Business ₂₀₀₈, 1₂.₈). According to the down 
of economy, and most of managers have faced no enlargement desire of domestic markets and 
the adoption of pure holdings company by business holdings’ group had increased and most of 
large scale business consider no hope of domestic market to become growth and it is natural 
that most executives of shopping market consider the oversea business deployment from no 
desire of the growth in domestic markets. 
　Owing with an interview on a manager of one of our researched pure holding company, he 
said that top executives had made more focusing into strategic business units which must be 
developed and they made some business units which need more autonomy to be necessary 
decentralized and delegate more.
　We think the focusing means collecting decision making authorities into head-quarter, and 
in some cases shared-services units are used for some business unit’s overhead-department in 
order to be more efficient. One of the reason why a company have adopted pure holding 
company systems is that organizational rearrangements become easier. For example, under 
the Aeon business holding company before such change of governance had been introduced 
some kind of mixed management between Aeon retail business and other business (including 
Aeon mall, financial service company and Aeon supermarket subsidiaries). After adopting pure 
holding company system, most of retailing or any other business units are equally managed 
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under pure holding head-quarter. That means the equalization of management or each 
subsidiary are managed just like a loose federation of independent states.
　₅.₂.₂　 The difficulty of making 1₀₀ % controlling of core subsidiaries in Aeon and Seven and 
i holdings.
　The way of organizational rearrangement to promote centripetal force on subsidiary is to 
abolish doing public of such company and a parent company make such subsidiary into one to 
be fully controlled. However, we think doing such action is very difficult for management team 
of parent company. For example, if Aeon holdings would try to buy total shares of Aeon Mall, 
he must announce TOB in stock market, and Aeon holdings need a large sum of money with 
premium value. If it would be very difficult for doing such action, Aeon management could do 
the exchange of stocks between Aeon’s share and a subsidiary’s share. We think the exchange 
of stocks is very difficult in Japan. For example, looking at the failure of such actions between 
Suntory Co. Ltd. and Kirin Co. Ltd., there are possibility for them not to agree with exchange 
rate of two companies’ share.
　₅.₂.₃　 The process of Seven and i holdings going into pure holdings company and 
Organizational arrangement
　 Seven and i pure holdings was established by two companies; Seven-Eleven Japan and 
Denys Japan in September ₂₀₀₅. Owing to our hearing examination with manager of Sven and 
i holdings, this company’s principle is to do business by himself as corporate culture. But, after 
buying department store, this company tends to do M&A in capital market. The company from 
the following situations tried to adopt pure holding company for making M&A or 
organizational rearrangements. 
　In 1₉₉₀’s and after the burst of economic-bubble, the performance of Itoh Yoka Do Co. 
became worse, and Itoh Yoka Do had had the parent position for Seven-Eleven Japan with ₇₀ 
percent share of stocks. If some stock holders would like to buy mass share of stock of Itoh 
Yoka Do, they might do the dominant role to Seven-Eleven Japan as share- holders of Itoh 
Yoka Do. In these days, the market value of stock of Itoh Yoka Do was less than that of Seven 
Eleven Japan, the management team of Itoh Yoka Do considers the necessary to correct such 
reversal situation of two companies’ values. They made pure holdings company on two 
retailing companies; Itoh Yoka Do and Seven Eleven Japan, and total rearrangement they also 
tried to buy out a department store (by our interview, November ₂₇th, ₂₀₀₉).
　This kind of organizational restructuring change each retailing company to be equal from 
the viewpoint of holding company and made some shops of Itoh Yoka Do Ltd. being abolished 
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because of being deficit. This kind of organizational rearrangement indicated that supermarket 
had got ₄ % sales ratio of group total sales volume but was invested ₃₆ % of group total amount 
of money (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₅, August ₈th, p. ₄₃).
　We think this organizational rearrangement means to dissolve the tendency of mutual 
dependence between Itoh Yoka Do and Seven Eleven Japan by means of becoming independent 
business segments (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₅, May 1₆, p. ₂₀). Seven and i bought Millennium 
group which are composed of Seibu department stores in the end of ₂₀₀₅, and the objectives of 
Seven and i holdings was to enter new department segments and top management group of 
Millennium wanted to keep a feeling of trust from major stockholders. We think the top 
management of Seven and i holdings did not try to scale up by additional M&A of department 
store group but considered to keep the possibility of new business creation through consumers’ 
information sharing between different type of retailing businesses up, although there was 
consumption to remain low (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₆, January ₉th, pp. ₆-₉). After such period of 
restructuring of business, Itoh Yoka Do’s subsidiary of Seven and i holdings withdrew clothing 
segment which was the main segment, and the half of retail stores being closed because this 
subsidiary showed the red results during the first half period of ₂₀1₀ (Nikkei Business, ₂₀1₀, 
December ₂₀).
5.3　 To put management resources together and Value creation: goods to be 
uniformed by Private brand, and Sharing of management information
　 ₅.₃.1　Aeon’s diversification and federation management
　Aeon group had developed by diversification of segments. The main sources of competency 
are scale economy which means to improve purchasing power, or price negotiation power 
against maker or manufacturing companies. Then, looking at the note of settlement of 
accounts of Aeon group in February of ₂₀11, their total retailing sales volume were ₆₉% of 
group total sales volume and operating profit of retailing was ₄₈% of total operating profit. 
However, each of the operating profit ratios of developer segments and services segments 
which include financial services and travel agency services etc. was ₂₃% and ₂₅%. Less than 
half of profit totals was achieved from non- retailing services.
　Aeon group was said to recognize much autonomy on subsidiary’s own management, because 
there were certain considerations about diversification route or M&A process in Aeon’s 
management. These type of management is called as “loose solidarity” or “federal state 
management”. Looking into detail of subsidiaries, there are not a few of subsidiaries to be 
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applicable with equity method. For example, there is significant subsidiary,” Maruetu” which 
are listed in the stock market. Also, there were 1₈ firms which were listed in Tokyo stock in 
February ₂₀11, and ₂₃ domestic firms or ₄ oversea subsidiaries which were applicable with 
equity method. We think much of centrifugal force of which are strong because such listed 
company had financing capability. Also, as each shop of retailing subsidiary had authority for 
making composition of goods, and there is high autonomy in each shop. Thus, Aeon pure 
holdings would like to share up the volumes of private brands, however, each regional 
company selected his own optimum selections of merchandise based on his market or 
customers and Aeon group original private brands are not selected in such regional shops or 
subsidiaries. Judging from such marketing trends or each product’s brand share of total group 
sales volume, we can say that Aeon group has strong centrifugal force with weak centripetal 
force (Nikkei Veritas, ₂₀1₀, p.1₅).
　₅.₃.₂　The strong centripetal force and controls of Seven and i Holdings
　Seven and i holdings has very strong centripetal force in comparison with Aeon Holdings 
and Seven and i has done top-down effort’s. One of such example is indicated from that Seven 
and i holdings has managed finance and master budget under the head-quarter of this group. 
As most subsidiary except for Holdings and Seven bank is not listed under Tokyo stock 
exchange, it means most of subsidiaries are managed by pure holdings company or head-
quarter of Seven and i group. Head quarter of Seven and i holdings had marketed “Seven 
Premium” brand of various goods to make private brand strong with the same strategy of Aeon 
group (May ₂₀₀₇). 
　This private brand is the result from group transversal product development efforts, and 
such development are done beyond each subsidiaries’ category. 
　In ₂₀₀₉ “seventy-four teams” has done each good development of “Seven Premium”. Each 
team is composed of merchandise buyers from various subsidiary, for example, Seven and 
Eleven (convenience store), Itoh Yoka Do (Super Market), York Benimaru (super Market). Also, 
such team not only have developed product development but also have studied supply chain 
management, demand forecasting, sales planning, etc. of Seven Eleven Japan. Thus, Seven 
and i Holdings have developed the know-how of Seven Eleven japan into another business 
segments by the use of his centripetal force. Also, Millennium Holdings as subsidiary of Seven 
and i holdings had demanded York Benimaru subsidiary to reform Seibu department store 
in Ikebukuro. The main goal of such strategic cooperation by York Benimaru to Seibu 
Department Store is concerned with how to use the feedback information of customers’ trend 
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under the principle of face to face selling which was the traditional selling way of Japanese 
department store (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₉, Feb. ₂nd, pp.₃₄-₃₆). We can say this case shows the 
transfer of knowledge and resource beyond each business model or business boundary.
5.4　The organization for Control: human resource and organizational management
　₅.₄.1　The characteristics of Aeon Holdings top management organization
　One element to decide the extent of holdings’ centripetal force is whether executive of 
holdings has dual role with doing executive role in business subsidiary. From doing this 
hearing research, in Aeon Holdings Company there are no any manager as full-time manager. 
The reason of that there are no such managers in holding company who is leaving for a 
subsidiary is there are salary gap between business companies or subsidiaries. Also, we think 
that there is information sharing between managers who are familiar with subsidiary’s 
business and who are detached from subsidiaries. However, it is possible that no separation 
between director’s function for each business subsidiaries and execution function of 
subsidiary’s business and we may think that dysfunctional effects for corporate governance of 
holdings company may be produced. Of course, there are no managers who are appointed as 
full-time manager. But, Aeon Holdings need persons who can check total results of each 
business, and there is a kind of place for a manager to be educated or go through senior 
management days. But, looking at the pattern of managers’ rotation, most of such movements 
was done in the same business segment and there might be some problems for training senior 
managers.
　As concerned with the framework of corporate governance, Aeon Holdings had established 
four committees; board of directors, auditing committee, reward committee, and nomination 
committee. In board of directors, more than half of directors are selected from candidates of 
outside directors (five persons are outside directors of total nine directors in April ₂₀11). A 
manager said that to do more mobility decisions our company decided to reduce a number of a 
few directors which means that averagely more directors are appointed or prepared in the 
same scale of this company.
　We can recognize that to reduce the number of directors may save the delays of decision 
making owing to diversification strategy or “loose federation management”. On the other hand, 
we think that introducing outside directors’ system indicates the expectation for intensifying 
corporate governance. 
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　₅.₄.₂　The characteristics of Seven and i Holdings’ top management organization
　Seven and i Holdings are managed under the following governance structure, executive 
officers’ system and auditors auditing officer system. In May ₂₀1₀, the board of directors were 
composed of 1₅ directors and ₂ of them was outside directors.
　Also, 1₃ persons as executive officers are nominated for prompt decision making and 
executions. 
　The board of directors with executive officers’ system can pay full attention into “planning 
management strategy” and “supervising operating execution of officers”, and they (directors) 
are not obliged to do execution management of strategy, so they can monitor executive 
manager’s results or process. Also, the staffs of auditors’ office must direct or assure internal 
auditing for subsidiaries and also audit the management of holdings. In addition, with such 
offices, there are some staffs to evaluate internal control system of group companies in Seven 
and i holdings company (Seven and i Holdings CSR report, ₂₀1₀, p. ₂₀).
5.5　International strategy and synergy
　₅.₅.1　Synergy effects through Aeon holdings’ oversea developments
　The reason of Aeon group to do overseas development is owing to the following reasons; a 
feeling of being trapped in domestic market, the high raising of Yen appreciation, and 
relatively less cost of workers in Asian countries. Aeon group has developed into Southeast 
Asian countries or China. They consider Chinese, the Asian nations, and Japan to be one 
market and has supplied high quality places, high quality goods and financial services. In 
China, Thailand, and Vietnam they also have supplied private brand’s goods as the name of 
“Top Value goods”.
　Thus, we think the synergy as group of Aeon Holdings Company is produced from using the 
group common functions or infrastructures. For example, Aeon group has introduced shared 
services in management functions by the connection of subsidiaries as like one company. Aeon 
Holdings Company has summarized accounting or human affairs activates of each subsidiary 
into one business unit under regional core company and promoted more efficiency of sales 
promotion and customer files management by means of Information technology.
　In Japan one shared service company was established in ₂₀₀₈ as the name of “Aeon Top 
Value company” to integrate the supply chain of “Top Value Brand”, which means product 
development, raw & materials purchasing, manufacturing and marketing. The reason of 
setting this company is that they make the windows between each functional department and 
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subsidiaries. Also, they established not only “Aeon good purchasing company” to summarize 
the total demand of each good but also “Global Supply Cain company” to support nation-wide 
logistics network (Aeon ₂₀1₀ group profile).
　According to ₂₀11’s new mid-range management plan of Aeon group, they had established 
three regional head-quarters, China, Southern Asia, and Japan, they would supply a kind of 
regional integrated services for finance and commerce shops. On the other hand, they should 
have decentralized such functions if it should be decentralized. For examples, recruiting local 
managers based on each country or nation and entrust them with almost all of management 
decision making. We could say that they adopted multi-federation management in inter-
national business strategy.
　₅.₅.₂　Seven and i holdings’ oversea developments
　Judging from our interviews into this holdings’ managers, they could not prepare the full 
systems for oversea ’ business development, and they could not establish some local 
subsidiaries. In china, the subsidiary is managed by hybrid-system which means mixing three 
factors, local capital and Japanese management and Chinese employees. 
　However, looking at the data source of this company, they had established convenient 
business in Northern European countries, Sothern Asian countries, Australia, China, Korea 
and North America (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₆, Sep. ₄th, p. ₂₈). Owing to the third half-quarter 
financial statement in ₂₀11, the number of Seven Eleven Peking Co. shop in China are ₉1 in 
the end of September ₂₀11 and the Seven-Eleven Inc. in Northern America had ₆,₅₀₅ shops in 
₂₀11. Owing to first food development, and private brands sales or developments, there was 
steady sales growth. Also, in the second segments, super-store business, they had developed 1₃ 
stores in China, the financial performance showed operation loss in September ₂₀11. New 
shops development had produced more costs than operating revenues, and also, more loss had 
been produced after the conflicts of southern inlands problems in ₂₀1₂.
　A report of the president, Toshifumi, Suzuki of Seven and i holdings said, “when we try to 
develop convenience shops in oversea markets, we consider such business to be domestic and 
more volume of consumptions has been realized, more local pattern in consumptions are 
realized.” And he said that we need to change shops to adopt new pattern of sales contents or 
sales volume.  
　According to his reports. in Japan or USA only to increase the number of such convenience 
shops is no significant for keeping business and to close no quality shops and to entry new 
shops in local market is necessary. The owners of each shop try to analyze own shop’s market 
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and try to buy goods under his own risk. As the results, owners had changed the lists of goods 
by themselves (Nikkei Business, ₂₀₀₆, Sep. ₄th, pp. ₄₆-₄₈).
　The strategy of developing new shops is very different from Aeon, national-wide strategy, 
and they have adopted local focusing strategy, that means developing shops in specific local 
markets. In Peking of China, Seven Eleven Co. had developed shops in  relatively high-income 
family’ s living areas (Nikkei Business, Sep. ₄th, p. ₃₃, p. ₄₇).
　Making summary of the interviews or articles of Japanese weekly magazines, we think top 
management of both, Aeon and Seven & i group had strong will to develop oversea business or 
choose global business strategy and to adopt “Pure Holdings Company” and to stop business 
holdings company is strong message from top management to employees as well as 
stakeholders. Also, we think that the practical merits of adopting this new organizational 
structure is to make all of business units into the same level and it is possible for management 
of holdings company to abolish shops or subsidiaries by means of each segments’ disclosures. 
In Japan, most of consumers market is shrinking because of decreasing young populations in 
all regional areas since ₂₀₀₀th.   
₆. Making strong the holding’s Centripetal force  
and Management Control systems
　Based on our case study for two retail companies above, we can say main points for “the 
organization to intensify centripetal force of head-quarter” and Management control system 
with such organizations.
6.1　Organization, human resource management and sharing a sense of value
　The methodology for increasing centripetal force is related to the following （a） through （I）. 
a. To construct horizontal organization across each business units.
b. Implementing several kinds of conferences
c.  Doing regular movement of managers between holdings and business units or between 
business units.
d.  Hold two posts of holdings officer and executive of business unit (Subsidiary) by a 
person (owners’ family).
e. Setting the office and the hours for face to face communications between managers
f. To train persons to be a generalist for communicating between business units.
g.  To train managers to be a specialist with financial engineering, accounting and 
The Analysis of the Management Control Systems in Holding Companies（Asada・Yori・Tomo）21
human affairs etc.
h.  To restrain negative effects of a results-oriented approach which means focusing only 
his own department’s performance.
i. It is necessary for establishing holdings’ office to purview for officer affairs.
　These kinds of items are to explain the necessary conditions for managers to make common 
platform who belongs to subsidiary or holdings in order to promote common sense about each 
other problems or common sense of some problems.
6.2　 The main player for getting fund resources and the allocation methods or the 
main player for getting debt’s based assets
　The second way for making holding company’s centripetal force more strengthen is to grasp 
the authority of both preparing funds and allocating such ones into subsidiaries. The revenue 
of Holdings comes through the dividends from business subsidiaries, and the payment for 
using holdings’ services from subsidiaries. On the other hand, if a subsidiary would go public, 
it could directly collect funds from stock exchange markets. If a holdings company would desire 
that a subsidiary could independently collect funds and enlarge his business-scale with getting 
more customers, such independent activities of subsidiary would be allowed from a holdings 
company. However, if such pure holdings would consider the necessary of getting more 
centripetal force, they would make subsidiary into 1₀₀% owned one and not recognize as the 
necessary inside funds in a subsidiary as well as demand more ratio of dividends from it. Thus, 
if a holdings company could set up the drawing up funds from a subsidiary, he could control 
subsidiary’s power. However, if there are no opportunity for an executive of subsidiary to be 
able to do autonomic managerial role and also no mechanisms of motivating such leader, there 
would be no positive effects of decentralization management. Thus, top management of 
holdings company are not concerned with each individual management concerns. he could do 
capital-profit-management based on the short-term EVA and ROI measurement with keeping 
the authority for the amount of capital increasing or the right of approval for a subsidiary to 
get funds as debt finance. He also gives the goals and the targets of Debit and Equity ratio or 
the balance efficiency about assets, debt and capital to subsidiary’s executives, after that, they 
can be conscious about ROE’s targets and be conscious about financial risk by D/E ratios’ 
increasing which will be shown under income statement of a subsidiary as the down of 
operating profits. Summarized up the explanations above, we think physical feedback 
management has done by financial data which means the performance management of 
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subsidiary has done by means of balance sheet and income statement of subsidiary.
　However, there may be some different insights by means of Aoki and Miyajima (₂₀11) who 
study of “Japanese enterprise governance”, According with his arguments, they said “the 
degree of decentralization with perfect subsidiaries is statistically higher than that the one 
under internal divisions or business units and such differences of the average scores about 
between two kinds of organizational structures are measured by two items, the degree of 
decentralization about strategic decision making or high-ranking managers’ affairs. There are 
significant differences about the distribution of decisions authority between decentralization 
as internal organization and decentralization with parents and subsidiaries.” (p. ₂₆₆). However, 
looking at this research (ibid., p.₂₆₇), there are no significant differences about human affairs 
of department head and subsidiaries’ president between two kinds of organizations.
　We think top management affairs is not delegated into subsidiaries and such human affairs 
management is the main control for pure holdings company.    
₇. Conclusions
　Japanese companies are often said that they have done the decentralization but looking at 
most of large industrial company, head-quarter often intervened into oversea subsidiaries’ 
decision making. This means head-quarter truly keep the significant power under his own 
domain. That is “Strong head-quarter”.
　However, as the oversea business had been developed, organizational scale-up has done and 
the degree of business diversifications has also been developed. It means the adopting 
decentralized organizations and the necessity of practical decentralization become more 
necessary. Making approach into practical problem solving, the main problems are the existing 
of the wall between business units, or holdings and subsidiaries. Thus, to preparer the 
windows between each unit or to make some holes between such walls is necessary for 
holdings to monitor the operations of subsidiary, and to rearrange organizational structure 
and to set up the system for purchasing various resources and move some resources to be 
surplus in some places into necessary places or units. We try to explain how to open the 
windows between subsidiaries or business units, and how to strengthen head-quarter’s 
centripetal force by means of “Case Study”. 
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